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"Exchange" Notions as Media of Social Scientific Exchange - 
A Cautionary Analogy, Yet Another Attempt at Conceptual Currency 
Reform
"Exchange" is an old, widely circulated, yet highly 
precarious conceptual currency in social science discourses. As 
with systems theoretical notions, "exchange" language is almost 
universally accepted if not used as a medium of exchange of ideas 
within and across disciplinary boundaries. But extensive 
circulation, widespread usage within a multiplicity of 
communications and ever new emissions by ever new theoretical 
issuing offices does, by itself, not insure the declared value. On 
the contrary, the oversupply of "exchange" notions inflates their 
exchange value: It became an intellectual currency which is always 
around in some way or the other without buying and that is 
explaining too much.
This very devaluation process can be understood in pursuing 
the analogy between conceptual currency and money a bit further. 
"Exchange" notions have not become theoretical notes yet (and 
probably never will). Unlike treasury notes or legal tender, 
guaranteed by a single, respected, monopolist authority - such as 
a government guaranteeing a currency or a bank guaranteeing checks 
or bank deposits - "exchange" theory is no promise to explain yet, 
backed by an uncontested intellectual authority and to be 





























































































Rather, it resembles primitive chains of obligations or 
modern "private money", which would constantly overstep the 
boundaries of their domain proper. Premodern and private bills of 
exchange, in principle, are of highly restricted use: They are 
fully accepted in some cosmopolitan villages called "disciplines", 
in certain small, closely-knit theoretical communities called 
"paradigms", or within theoretical shops named "schools" only.
Consequently, their dependence on mutual trust and confidence 
among adherents of the same creed allows for a cancelling out of 
explanatory obligations in short cycles, within the paradigmatic 
tribe only. Other tribes within or even outside the disciplinary 
territory simply ignore the presumably worthless pieces of paper 
regulating exchange within the tribe. But even here, primitive 
transaction-chains are in permanent danger of being blown up by 
just one important "outsider" in the chain; hence, the obsession 
of scientific tribes with thought control and "treason", doxa and 
heresy.
If we compare the manifold "exchange" notions in contemporary 
social science discourses with monies guaranteed by private 
parties only - such as credit accounts of a stores' customers or a 
credit card company - the result is similar: Each can be spent in 
certain theoretical areas and even magazines only; it will be 
accepted exclusively as illiquid assets; transfers to outside its 




























































































"exchange" concepts can be transferee! to other theoretical realms 
at expensive discount only.
This situation reminds of an historical constellation before 
the development of modern money. Like early notes, "exchange" 
notions are restricted to given circles of social acquaintanceship 
and intellectual trading areas, should they actually pay. There 
are competing local "exchange" notions of different paradigms 
within each disciplinary terrain, usually preferred over general 
theoretical notes issued by a central intellectual authority - 
such as "economics" often claims within the human and social 
sciences.
Thus, there is an ongoing struggle over the imposition of a 
single theoretical tender by this discipline, enjoying the 
greatest reputation and confidence, and other trusted and 
respected intellectual "schools". As "economist" or "rational 
choice" notions are not universally as acceptable to intellectual 
creditors as other debtor's notes, they recurrently fail to 
circulate and accumulate in the hands of most trustworthy 
paradigmatic leaders, whose own "exchange" notions circulate. 
Their acceptability depends on the reputation and known resources 
of the conceptual issuer and guarantor.
This would not constitute any problem, as long as these 
theoretical special purpose monies were not overdrafted and 




























































































credit cards in contemporary Western societies, there is a trend 
towards an ever-widening range of theoretical, explanatory 
obligations covered by some kind of "exchange" concept as valid 
currency. Though a non-universal theoretical money, it invites to 
shop around intellectually in ever new areas. Yet, how to prevent 
to use another conceptual "exchange" card than the one adequate in 
a given situation? What generally used private monies actually buy 
in other fields in terms of explanatory power is quite uncertain: 
Exchange rates with other conceptual monies are extremely 
fluctuating and instable; speculations are the rule while constant 
holding is highly risky; inflationary use is hard to prevent; 
"black" and other secondary currencies to fall back on emerge etc. 
But why, then, is some "exchange" currency still used and trusted 
at all, even more, why is it time and again issued anew instead of 
switching to another, more solid medium of scientific exchange?
One possible reason for this loyalty to such a problematic 
conceptual medium might be the silent presumption of high 
securities. For all that, it is still a main currency of the one 
most important disciplinary empire within the humanities, that is 
economics, which founded its intellectual production on this 
conceptual resource. Being of such powerful heritage might feed 
the expectation, that "exchange" notions are part of a medium 
which, finally, will pay its way to explain the world in all its 




























































































Acting upon this idle hopes, a number of prominent social 
scientists continually attempted, over the last decades, either to 
smuggle in or "imperialistically" impose economistic notions of 
"exchange" to replace or reconvert other - anthropological, 
political science, sociological, social psychological 
theoretical currencies of "exchange". In this respect, endeavours 
to redefine everything from interpersonal relations to 
international warfare as "exchanges" are equally telling as the 
efforts to reinterpret all kind of social and political exchanges 
by the economic model of perfect market competition - political 
exchange being market relations between political actors.
This levelling out of intellectual domains by overdrafting 
one special, economic "exchange" concept, I hold, will not restore 
and stabilize the conceptual "exchange" currency but, at the 
contrary, further inflate it. Instead, a fundamental theoretical 
currency reform on "exchange" concepts in political and social 
theory seems necessary, basic prerequisites of which have already 
been laid ground in as different areas as economic and cultural 
anthropology, functional systems theory, network analysis, 
interorganizational and collective decision theory, policy 
sciences, political economy and political sociology, corporatist 
neo-institutionalism etc. While none of these approaches has yet 
come up with a single and definite convincing framework of 
"political exchange", each of them could contribute to raise the 




























































































But restoring the theoretical exchange value of "exchange" 
concepts renders necessary specializing them: Instead of a 
fashionable rational choice exchange notion, which might be 
universally interchangeable, but values and buys little in certain 
world areas to be explained by social science, a less convertible, 
more domain-specific or special purpose conceptual currency such 
as "political exchange" might do and do better than a flimsy 
flimsy, catching all and nothing in particular.
This is exactly what I am proposing to do in this paper, 
introducing the concept of "generalized political exchange" as a 
kind of theoretical voucher in social science. While its use is 
restricted to explain a specific class of phenomena only, it 
should allow to understand them more fully than those "exchange" 
notions which claim to explain absolutely everything - a little 
bit only. What the new conceptual currency of "generalized 
political exchange" is claimed to explain is just what the still 
prevalent market models of exchange define out of possible 
understanding: The logic of ongoing risky transactions between 
organized, collective actors with functionally interdependent, yet 
competing or even antagonistic interests, and not to be regulated 
(sufficiently) by legal-contractual devices.
This paper is part of a series of preliminary considerations 
on "generalized political exchange". It sets out to argue how a 
specific and most precarious class of macropolitical-economic 




























































































distinguishes extended networks of interdependent transactions 
within an economic policy community from simple, dyadic barter 
between state and interest associations - the prototypical 
exchange constellation in what could be called the Italian model 
(Parri 1985). A second, closely related paper (Marin 1985 a) 
concentrates on the logic of "generalized political exchange" and 
on problems of analysis: How is it possible at all and what makes 
it so difficult (yet promising) to study it. A third paper 
(Marin/Wagner 1985) develops the key notion of "market 
hierarchies" and reconstructs macroeconomic management - the 
single most important dimension of governance in advanced 
industrial societies - as "generalized political exchange" - 
claiming to provide a non-institutionalist alternative to the 
various (pluralist, corporatist) paradigms of neo­
institutionalism.
The new concept can be clarified by analyzing typical 
macroeconomic-political transactions to be understood as 
"exchange"; but what exactly constitutes a case in point cannot be 
determined without some theoretical preconceptions. A non- 
arbitrary way-out of this inevitable hermeneutical circle 
requires, as will be seen, recourse to economic models as well as 




























































































POLITICAL EXCHANGE: WHAT IS A CASE IN POINT?
Defining political exchange as mutually contingent, 
macropolitical and -economic transactions between autonomous, 
organized, collective actors with divergent/competitive/ 
antagonistic, but functionally interdependent interests, the 
binding character of which cannot be based on law and contract, 
does not lead very far in specifying the notion. But it does, at 
least, cut out ab initio a wide range of phenomena often loosely 
associated with political exchange, which actually might be 
understood more precisely by other concepts.
Clientelistic patronage for instance, and corresponding deals 
between a tutelary party machine and individuals or groups of 
citizens; interactions between elected representatives as 
legislators and their constituencies; negotiated agreements 
between political parties and, more generally, coalition behavior 
and alliances between territorially-based interest organizations; 
lobbying in public offices; cartel arrangements between 
oligopolist firms; bargaining between management/organizational 
leadership and work force/rank and file; haggling between 
ministerial and subordinate service agencies; governmental 
decision-making; mergers, interlocking directorates or other forms 
of vertical integration between companies; strategic intermarriage 
to underpin interorganizational relations by kinship ties; vote 




























































































of exchange-related and politically relevant patterns which do not 
constitute political exchange according to the initial definition.
But, then, what is it what is to be covered and explained by 
a specified and theoretically elaborated notion of generalized 
political exchange, what cuts out so many most interesting 
phenomena and, at the same time, has not been understood
sufficiently by existing conceptualizations yet? Let us start with 
a meanwhile "classical" example, which has become a downright 
paradigmatic case of political exchange, in order to see to what 
an extent the transaction analysed and the analytical tool derived 
from this analysis hold generally.
Scambio Politico
Pizzorno (1978), in his seminal essay which started an 
ongoing theoretical debate in social science, focuses on the 
following most elementary constellation.
"A factory decides to close. Although the market power of the 
workers affected is then by definition nil, since there is no 
demand for their services, they or their union take an action 
which obtains some total or partial revision of the management 
decision. How is this possible? The answer is often in terms of 
political pressure or political power exercised by the union. Some 
gain has been obtained in exchange for something 'political'. What 




























































































are being traded in this political market? While in the atomistic 
market more gains were obtained in exchange for more effort, and 
in the collective bargaining in exchange for continuity of work, 
in the political market the resource given in exchange may be 
called consensus or support. An actor (generally the government) 
which has goods to give is ready to trade them in exchange for 
social consensus with an actor who can threaten to withdraw that 
consensus (or, which is more or less the same, to endanger order) 
unless he receives the goods he needs. In a situation of pure 
collective bargaining, industrial action means threat to withdraw 
continuity of work. The exchange becomes political when the threat 
is withdrawal of the wider social consensus or social order. The 
resource in the hand of workers in the case of political exchange 
is regulated according to completely different criteria from the 
case of collective bargaining. Market power in the latter case 
depends on the demand for labour. The value of the consensus 
resource depends instead on completely, different circumstances" 
(279), and he summarizes that this political "market power is a 
function of the need for consensus" (280) which bears "no 
necessary relation to the demand for the product of these workers, 
and (is) thus external to the market on which collective 
bargaining takes place" (279).
But this very gap between collective bargaining and political 
exchange, "the fact that the amount of power which a group may 
exercise is not a function of the contribution it makes to 




























































































in an industrial relations system" (280), and of inflationary 
pressures in particular. Equilibrium in the political market 
(based on macroeconomic stability) can be regained by a well- 
calculated under-exploitation of short-term market power in 
exchange for some kind of guarantee of future repayment. The power 
of a union to obtain future benefits in exchange for immediate 
moderation depends on its capacity for strategy, that is to 
interpret short-run demands in the light of more long-term 
interest, and "the state increasingly becomes the main structure 
in charge of the guarantee of long-term goals ... This makes the 
state the obvious 'other side' in the bargain through which 
present restraint is traded for future security" (286).
There is a further mechanism bringing about the same result. 
Such as exchange on the political market is external to collective 
bargaining exchanges, so does industrial action generate 
"secondary effects analogous to the external economies" of market- 
decisions. The very control of these increasingly frequent and 
potentially damaging secondary effects of industrial action 
becomes in itself a main resource of political exchange between 
private actors like unions, capable of endangering the socio­
political order, and the state, held responsible for it. State 
activities which produce the political market as opportunity 
structure for political exchanges are related to "systematic 
interdependences which exist among the units of the economy"




























































































This is not the place to go into the elaborations and 
subtleties of Pizzorno's model of political exchange, but a few 
observations should be made immediately. First, disruptive 
potentials and limits of political exchange are located in the 
process itself, where the union "power of obtaining future 
benefits ... becomes power over its own members" (284), but the 
leeway in interoganizational intermediation is limited by intra- 
organizational rank and file unrest or the emergence of new 
representatives and collective identities outside the exchanging 
actors. Secondly, Pizzorno breaks with the individualistic 
premises of traditional economic exchange theories, applied to 
politics (Curry and Wade 1968). Consensus as the resource 
exchanged politically, for instance, is not aggregated individual 
support of single citizens expressed by vote, as the "economic 
theories of democracy", following Schumpeter, would have it. In 
this model, political consumers buy preferred policies from 
political entrepreneurs who freely compete on the marketplace of 
liberal democracy. The consensus exchanged by interest 
organizations in contrast, is rather a collective support of 
public policies by compliance to rules or negotiated agreements, a 
restraint of any collective action capable of damaging economic 
stability and socio-political order.
Thus Pizzorno, without ever saying so, radicalizes the 
"Oxford's school" criticism of the "classical" view of collective 
bargaining of the Webbs as expressed by Allan Flanders (1968). 




























































































of individual exchanges (and for the unions an alternative to 
mutual insurance and legal enactment, forced upon employers 
against their will) but a joint regulation of the terms of work, 
so does political exchange not replace collective bargaining but 
regulate it. Such as collective bargaining is not just an economic 
process in which unions act as a labor cartel but a political 
institution making rules and diplomatic use of organizational 
power within a power-relationship, so is political exchange not 
simply an extension of bargaining as a market activity to the 
state realm; rather, it involves different power resources and 
different collective actors as well - political exchange, in 
contrast to collective bargaining, does not require the union as 
main actor intermediating consensus. And while the political 
market is constituted by the "political aspects of the labour 
market" (278), political exchanges cannot be reduced neither to 
joint regulation or political bargaining on the labor market nor 
to the pressure group activities to make the state enforcing 
negotiated rules agreed upon in the collective bargaining process.
Whereas Flanders recognized the political character of a 
supposedly economic exchange in collective bargaining, which is 
not just individual exchange for many, Pizzorno not longer looks 
on the political dimensions of exchanges between private actors 
but focuses on the very logic of transactions between private 
organized collectivities and public authorities in the political 
market, constituted by the latter. Hence, all the basic elements 




























































































political exchange to market behavior of political actors, are at 
hand: Functional interdependence and mutual interest contingency, 
corresponding strategic complexity and political indeterminacy of 
exchange rates as well as the crucial role of time and history of 
political in contrast to market exchange patterns.
Why then, does one need to elaborate the concept? Are there 
types of political transactions it does not cover sufficiently or 
do the same exchanges within different contexts require a 
different, more general modelling? In order to test the 
explanatory power of the analytical tool, we will look at a 
somewhat more complex and that is "real" configuration of 
political exchange. As Pizzorno claims "that the difference in the 
extent to which the political market impinges upon the positions 
of the workers, the unions and the employers, is the main variable 
in distinguishing among national industrial relations systems" 
(287), a general theoretical framework should also cover the 




























































































A Simple Transaction -Chain
Think of this union wage strategy as an under-exploitation of 
short-term market power in exchange for future benefits. Trade 
unions and employers associations agree, for macroeconomic 
considerations, to keep collective bargaining ana nominal wage 
increases within the following framework: wage increases are 
basically uniformous, that is all categories get about the same 
relative increase of gross income; they are oriented at the real 
average growth in labor productivity throughout the national 
economy; and in calculating nominal wage increases, the collective 
bargaining parties rely on a common forecasting of future 
inflation rates.
Such a wage policy guarantees a certain synchronisation 
between gross national product and mass incomes; generally, it 
sets neither restrictive nor inflationary impulses. But persistent 
sectoral differentials in productivity increases not only induce 
constant pressure to innovate and rationalize firms, but also 
generate some domestic structural inflation, which has to be 
anticipated at the negotiation table, when interest organizations 
bargain over nominal wage increases.
In a short-term perspective, expansionary 
increasing demand for consumer goods are maintained; 
term perspective, entrepreneurs are under effective
effects of 





























































































raise productivity; in a long-term view, consensus on income 
distribution can be kept up; given wage differentials between 
categories of labor are kept as much as the functional 
distribution of income between labor and capital. The only 
redistribution caused by a uniformous and productivity oriented 
wage policy is between company profits in different branches, and 
that seems acceptable to unions as long as employers associations 
are capable of disciplining their most profitable member firms or 
sectoral representatives.
But how is such a simple but strange, highly unprobable,
implicit and unwritten "social contract", setting the terms of
contract for formal collective agreements, possible at all? Why
and how do the parties agree on these terms of incomes policy and 
make their constituencies comply to these agreements? And what 
have these meta-rules for regulating collective bargaining to do 
with political exchange , or, more precisely: what kind of 
political exchange is the negotiated incomes policy sketched above 
a part of?
Here, the picture gets a bit mpre complicated. Obviously 
enough, unions and employers associations must have some sound 
reason to voluntarily share governmental responsibility for 
inflation, the control of which in other contexts resorts with the 
central bank and not with the parties of incomes policy. If we 
assume that all collective actors involved display a limited, but 




























































































overall game they play which makes such incomes political moves 
meaningful or feasible at all, what are its rules, and what are 
the spaces of manoeuvre it leaves for collective bargaining and 
the opportunity structures for political exchanges proper?
For, in order to produce the collective good of macroeconomic 
stability by imposing collective discipline on wages and prices, 
trade unions and employers associations must operate within a 
larger framework of macroeconomic management and political 
division of labor. All such efforts would be shallow would not the 
central bank take responsibility for controlling "imported" 
inflation through an exchange rate policy neutral to foreign 
trade, which, on the average, does not affect national price 
competitiveness on world markets; nor would they be acceptable to 
labor organizations, would the government not take responsibility 
for maintaining high levels of employment by filling the deflatory 
gap between demand and supply through public deficit spending. 
Though a residual function in the hierarchy of macroeconomic 
policy tasks and the corresponding time sequence of decisions to 
be taken,, governmental fiscal "insurance" to compensate ex post 
in case of losses based on false equilibrium expectations is an 
integral and indispensable element in stabilizing optimistic 
entrepreneurial expectations as well as the risky advances of 
"responsible" unions.
Within this division of political labor in stabilization 




























































































restrictive interventions, which they fear a lot, and thereby they 
free themselves from this fear: In exchange for internalizing 
responsibility for domestic inflation control, unions neutralize 
an otherwise unpredictable and threatening environment. But as 
this arrangement rests on a concerted exchange rate policy of the 
central bank, trade unions pay another, more important price in 
addition to having to oblige their rank and file to wage 
moderation: In order to secure the possibility of adquate returns 
in terms of employment guarantees, they have to engage in another 
series of political exchanges, including government, to compensate 
for a corresponding loss of monetary steering resources in 
macroeconomic management.
The importance as well as the political exchange rates of 
this other transaction-chain result from the technicalities of the 
logic of a Keynesian strategy. (Unions tend to have a strong 
preference for Keynesianism, as it is the only economic paradigm 
and political meta-game which gives them some saying and defines 
their constituent interests as universal and of macroeconomic 
relevance, see Lindberg 1983). Within this super-game, the central 
bank has to accommodate to foreign interest rate developments, 
once it has chosen to pursue a determinate exchange rate policy. 
Thus, it cannot counteract an international hausse in interest 
rates by a policy of "cheap money" if it will not run the risk of 
massive capital outflow. This dilemma between exchange rate and 
interest rate oriented monetary policy can be circumvented by 




























































































"financial circulation" and a domestic and productive investment 
oriented money market; but to establish a protected "production 
circulation" through a network of subsidized credits for 
investments and exports, government must support this transaction- 
chain and actually contribute this crucial link. Without 
regulating short-term financial capital markets, it has to make 
for a protected capital market segment for productive investment 
and to stabilize middle-term and optimistic entrepreneurial 
expectations. The central bank, in turn, must agree that the 
amount of "cheap money" circulating is regulated by fiscal policy 
and that is by public households and not by its own monetary 
policy.
Let us, at this point, break off the description of the game 
sketched, without looking into the more complicated economic 
technicalities. Its economic consequences - such as a de-coupling 
of feedback mechanisms for price-dynamics, realizing the 
"classical dichothomy" - as well as its coherence and viability as 
a macroeconomic program have been analysed more fully elsewhere 
(Wagner 1985, Marin/Wagner 1985). There is an ongoing debate among 
economists of how to interpret this most unconventional but 
successful policy-mix theoretically ( e.g.Tichy 1984, Wagner 1985) 
or how to identify its success (Scharpf 1981, 1983). Others have 
looked into the actual fit of empirically identifiable economic 
policies with the underlying macroeconomic model (Marin, 




























































































implications of the above sketch for an analysis of political 
exchange, to be elaborated a bit in the next section.
Quite obviously, what was called a simple transaction-chain 
can be analysed as a pattern of political exchange as much as the 
elementary barter prototype of the Italian paradigm. It starts 
with the very same case of union wage moderation, but allows for 
some more contextual elements to be taken into consideration: At 
least for the series of other, related games than the one of which 
the political exchange of collective bargaining outcome is part 
of. This leads, as will be seen, to the conception of networks of 
generalized political exchange and met a (super)games or political- 
economic regimes. It builds on the significant difference and 
greater generality of this type of political exchange than the one 
originally introduced by Pizzorno and other Italian scholars, 
following his conceptualization.
From Barter to Exchange-Networks
What are the differences between the two cases of political 
exchange presented above and what is the significance of these 
differences in terms of a general theoretical framework to 
interpret such precarious transaction patterns?
In order to clarify the divergent exchange perspectives 
underlying the different examples chosen to analyse, we will look 




























































































conceptualization will have to come up with answers, and actually 
does: What is the terrain or field of political exchange? Who are 
the collective actors participating in the transaction? What is 
the relationship between them? What resources do they trade? How 
do they do it? Why do they do it the way they do it and not 
otherwise? What for do they exchange at all? What is at stake in 
the transaction? How long will they go on playing the game? When 
do what kind of political exchange pattern arise at all?
W h e r e  ?
A first, and most obvious difference concerns where the 
political exchange actually takes place. Pizzorno (and virtually 
all followers in the Italian debate) concentrate on the labor 
market and its political aspects, not "stemming directly from the 
relationship between employers and employees ... at work" (277), 
but from governmental interventions, public policies, legal 
frameworks or long-term union strategies within the political 
system. The field they focus on, thus, is the political 
implications of collective bargaining or of extra-institutional 
action: The domain of the political market created by government 
through its very dealings with the parties of the labor market - 
as far as labor organizations in particular are able and willing 
to control and trade the political externalities of labor market 




























































































Against that, in the simple transaction-chain example, the 
terrain of political exchange comprises a multitude of other 
markets, and occasionally even the political arena of political 
parties and parliament proper. While collective wage agreements
are to be found in the labor market, corresponding price controls
(whatever the mechanism chosen from outright state control to
autonomous voluntary self-regulation by the social parties or the
industries themselves) affect operation in product markets. The
incomes policy resulting from exercising collective discipline on 
wage developments in labor markets and pricing in product markets, 
again, has to be mediated to collective action on domestic money
and credit markets as well as on international financial markets.
These markets, constituting an economic arena for political
exchanges, are not only many, but also interdependent; and they
are not only interdependent, but also hierarchically ordered. The
ordering itself is induced politically, through exchange
processes, and the resulting market hierarchies define the
respective fields and games of political exchange and their
boundaries., Whether fully intended, recognized and accepted or
not, some kind of market hierarchy always exists and determines a
corresponding set of political games. Any kind of labor market 
transaction and related political exchange, therefore, is 
inevitably part of a much larger terrain of a politically 
structured interdependence of markets and simply cannot be




























































































W h o ?
This leads immediately to a second, important difference of 
the two cases in point: Who are the collective actors 
participating in political exchange? In what might be called 'The 
Italian Model' the main protagonists are two, sometimes three: 
Trade unions and the federal government or the central state, with 
occasional taking into account of (organized) capital as the 
respective counterpart in labor markets. As the model strongly 
centers on labor organizations, workers sometimes come in to play 
their role as a demanding constituency, the representation and 
governance of which remains a permanently precarious task for 
organized labor leadership. In terms of numbers, the 'political 
market' is just the opposite of a heavily populated economic 
market and resembles much more how textbook economics exemplifies 
exchange processes: with Robinson Crusoe and Friday.
Transaction-chains, at the contrary, are composed of a few, 
that is neither just two nor too many actors. In cases like the 
one sketched, there is a series of additional collective actors 
participating in political exchanges: Organized labor, for 
instance, is not only represented by (a unitary or several 
competing) trade unions (sometimes helped by labor parties), but 
also by shop floor or company representatives (shop stewards, 
Betriebsraete, works councillors, comités d'entreprise or délégués 




























































































etc.; with the degree of integration between central 
confederations and affiliated unions or between peak associations 
and other working class representatives as a crucial variable.
Correspondingly, organized capital cannot be thought of as a 
unitary, coherent collective actor, which is far from true even at 
the level of employers associations. In some fields, other inter- 
organizational clusters such as trade associations, cartels, 
dominant firm conglomerates in strategically important sectors, 
often leading public enterprises or banks controlling industrial 
capital or public debtors play a decisive role in some political 
games. Similarly, "the state" is not simply central government, 
but regional or local governments (and their coordinated, inter­
governmental exchange-relations) might be even more important for 
a counter-cyclical budget policy within a federal structure, as 
much as this holds for various "parafisci" like social security or 
pension funds.
This reminds of two more crucial actors in any 
macropolitical-economic exchange-network, ignored in the 'Italian 
model'. Autonomous cooperative bodies composed of representatives 
both of organized labor and organized capital do, in many 
countries, play an independent and important if not guiding role 
in the formation of political exchanges underlying macroeconomic 
decisions. Here, the Social-Economische Raad (Estor 1965) in the 
Netherlands, the Swedish Harpsund-Conferences and the succeeding 




























































































Samordningsraad and later the Kontaktutvalget (Rokkan 1966, Olsen 
1983) or the Austrian Paritaetische Kommission (Marin 1982) are 
just the most prominent cases in point of these cooperative, joint 
decision-making bodies, participating in and often substantially 
shaping the transaction-chains.
Even more so does the central bank in any one country. 
Whereas the significance of cooperative collective actors varies a 
lot between different national contexts (in some countries they 
simply do not exist), the federal reserve bank is always crucial 
in ordering the market hierarchy which then serves as an 
opportunity structure for ongoing political transactions. In the 
model outlined above, for instance, it is the one most central 
actor to keep the overall system in balance and other 
collectivities including central government have to flexibly adapt 
their strategies to the parameters set first by the monetary 
authorities. Thinking of empirical cases leads to the same 
conclusion as the model: The Deutsche Bundesbank counteracting an 
at least moderately expansionary fiscal policy of the West German 
government in the late 1970s by a most restrictive monetary 
policy; after 1979, the Bank of England tightly controlling money 
supply or the American Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker keeping 
up real interest rates at levels which also affected the terms of 
political trade between capital and labor in all European 
economies, all these examples confirm the absolutely crucial role 
of central banks in any one economic policy community. The Italian 




























































































powerful actor on the overall political economy, cannot provide 
an adequate assessment of specific exchanges even within the 
terrain of labor markets and their relationship to the state only: 
How could the unions be expected to forego immediate opportunities 
for gains if even the most labor-friendly government is not able 
to guarantee that its commitments to future repayments will not be 
upset by a counteracting strategy of the central bank?
H o w
In what sense, more systematically, does the exchange- 
relationship differ in the two cases presented above? The ‘Italian 
model' clearly implies a dyadic or bilateral relation, 
occasionally extended to a tri-partite constellation, which very 
often reduces to a two-step-bilateralism: Unions offer controlling 
their very behavior with the counter-party on the labor market in 
an anticipatory manner or ex post in exchange with government. The 
collective actors involved in the transactions are in a 
structurally asymmetric relationship with regard to the nature as 
well as to the power of the power resources exchanged: While 
private interest organizations may have resources at their 
disposal which are potentially obstructive enough to force public 
authorities to enter in an exchange relationship at all, the state 
is always held to be in command of more powerful resources due to 




























































































imbalance in the exchange-relation between the state and private 
interest organizations is seen in the central structural position 
of the former: It is the state which constitutes the political 
market and which, therefore, is essential and dominant in any 
exchange transaction.
Political exchanges are fundamentally different structured in 
a more extended economic policy community. First of all, economic 
policy communities are not constituted by the state or other 
legitimate public authorities, but by the contingency of 
historical processes making some collective actors more and others 
less powerful and indispensable in governing the economy; as well 
as by the very same market hierarchies which themselves are 
brought about by the very same historical actors latter on 
constrained by them. Contrary to the 'Italian model', neither 
trade unions nor the state are necessarily part of every or even 
any exchange-network: In countries such as the United States, 
Japan, France or Switzerland, unions are at best a most marginal 
element of the economic policy community; and in many more 
countries we find economic policy games played which are neither 
imposed by governments nor do they leave any place for even the 
most powerful labor organizations.
If any ordering of collective actors - that is their 
respective political "weight" as well as their exchange-linkages 
with other collective actors further "up" or "down" the 




























































































a historical given but actually created by a specific market 
hierarchy, then exchange-relations and power structures are not 
fixed once for ever, but changing with the political games and 
meta-games played. Unions and the state are of widely varying 
importance, and in some games they do not play a role whatsoever; 
and the state, if present, is not always stronger than other, 
private collective actors.
Additionally, exchange-relations in an extended field are of 
a fundamentally different nature than the ones analysed in the 
'Italian model'. In the dyadic structure (which is not only 
typical for the "political exchange" literature but implicit also 
in theconceptual tools developed in most of the "social exchange" 
models of the Homans 1961 or Blau 1964 type), transactions are 
necessarily mutually contingent: tit is given for tit and 
sometimes tit for tat. But while the repayment is not always 
possible hie et nunc, it is expected to come from the other party 
and from that party only, within a controllable and agreed upon 
time span. Any continuation of political exchange, thus, is 
contingent upon sufficient returns from the one chosen (private) 
or fixed (state) other side - and that is highly precarious.
Patterned linkages within a broader economic policy 
community, at the contrary, are not only multi-lateral, but also 
no simple extension of bilateral transactions. Continued exchange 
is not contingent upon a specific quid pro quo by a specific 




























































































network alltogether. Exchange within complex configurations - 
whether they have the form of long cylces, rings, chains or 
extended trees - is not just a linked aggregation of two party/two 
way political barter. Bilateral barter might actually be excluded 
if expected to be at the expense of (all the) other actors in the 
network or incompatible with the exchange system itself, which 
directs the flow of certain valued resources in one direction 
only.
This distinction is strictly analogous to what Lévi-Strauss 
(1947/1973), in the completely different context of matrilateral 
cross-cousin marriage, analysed as restricted and generalized 
exchange. In generalized exchange, a lineage cannot receive women 
from a lineage it gives women to (the opposite would be the simple 
rule of restricted exchange, analogous to political barter), 
except it first fullfils its primary obligation to give its own 
women to another lineage than the one it married women from. 
Benefits from one party must be returned to a third party, which 
makes for reciprocity between a great number of partners. Through 
a complicated set of rules, exchange-relations are organized in a 
specific, irreversible direction.
Similarly, political exchange networks form cycles where 
certain valuables will flow in one direction only. Governments 
cannot be subsidized and they cannot be given tax exemptions 
(though they can be granted more or less favorable credit 




























































































organizational securities for membership recruitment or rank and 
file mobilization; employers or trade associations will not be 
offered legislative powers; and trade unions might not be easily 
threatened by announcements to regulate capital flows - while each 
of these resources exchanged is highly valued a return by other 
actors in the transaction-chain.
Furthermore, most collective actors are not reciprocated 
primarily by those parties they offer concession or support to, 
but by strategically placed third parties. If unions hold back on 
wages, to take a much preferred Italian example, it is their 
counterpart on the collective bargaining table and even more 
specific firms which profit from it by higher profitability, 
without being able to repay directly or even adequately. 
Governments might be supported if committed to an incomes policy, 
but with respect to other games - not to speak of electoral 
popularity - wage restraint might turn out to be a danaer's gift, 
undermining popular consensus and cabinet support.
This even more so to the extent that system payoffs, 
providing valued returns for the risky advances offered by 
organized labor, are outside the domain of effective government 
control: Employment levels depend mainly on private capital 
investment decisions; and inflation rates (in our second case) 
are, above all, to be controlled by the central banks exchange 
rate (neutral or "hard currency") policy. In other meta-games or 




























































































influences labor market developments, which are of central concern 
to working class union members asked for wage moderation, 
eventually by a government which itself has no power to guarantee 
future repayments in terms of new jobs to be created.
But as far as central government cannot guarantee future 
security in exchange for short-term restraint, it ceases to be the 
focal and essential 'other side' in the transaction, as the 
'Italian model' would have it. No single actor in an extended 
network of generalized political exchange has an effective 
monopoly of coercive ressources and is dominant in all games 
played - or could, for instance, anyone imagine a democratic 
government in a capitalist market society effectively controlling 
capital flows in and out the country?
W h a t ?
But what do the collective actors actually exchange in terms 
of ressources, if transactions are not simply mutually contingent, 
rewarding returns to each other? What flows through the networks 
constituted by specific market hierarchies, if the overall 
structure cannot be conceived of as composed of a series of dyadic 
barter arrangements where diffuse consensus or support organized 





























































































While within the 'Italian model' there is a variety of 
conceptualizations to understand the support mobilized by private 
actors, it ultimately always boils down to an exchange of (social, 
political) power resources between private organizations and 
public authorities. In contrast to this one-dimensional exchange 
of power resources (of different nature and origin), transactions 
within comprehensive fields are multi-dimensional: They also 
comprise the simple passing on of technical information in 
collaborative efforts as well as the transfer of services or the 
communication of normative expectations, with varying degrees of 
power implications. When it comes to power, it is less the 
resources at the disposal of the collective actors or the capacity 
to use them, which is traded, but the actual exercise of these 
"possibilities for action" (Crozier/Friedberg 1979) - which 
includes, of course, threats as the formulation of these 
possibilities, withdrawl of action, non-decisions, suspense of 
exchange, blocking of the possibilities for action, self-binding 
commitments not to exercise them etc.
If these variety of valuables exchanged - consensus, support, 
concessions, guarantees, mutual respect of political status rights 
and duties, symbolic attributions of responsibilities, access to 
authoritative decision-making, effective membership control, 
commitment to compromised rules, renouncing of strategic exit and 
voice-options, power and withholding of power - has to be reduced 
to one underlying dimension, the common minimal denominator is 




























































































with quite specific and highly differential rules of the games and 
regimes (meta-games) of any one participating actor which 
constitutes the valued return on which all the other actors' 
compliance is contingent upon. This reciprocally contingent flow 
of compliance with a system of rules asking different actors for 
rather different obligations - and not a linking of mutually 
rewarding two party/two way transactions - holds political 
exchanges together: No direct repayments might be more 
"reinforcing" a return than immediate returns, considered to be 
side payments threatening to blow up the whole transaction-chain.
H o w  c o m e
In order to control these political rents generated by 
unregulated barter, which is the core transaction of the 'Italian 
model', generalized exchange networks rest on a hierarchically 
ordered set of rules of game and meta-games, inducing "calculated 
rigidities" of collective action: Not every power resource can be 
traded any longer in the political market. But in order to 
represent acceptable constraints on possible courses of collective 
action, political exchange rules must fulfill at least the 
following, interdependent requirements: They must a) actually 
allow for a control of opportunistic behavior, b) generate




























































































strategic opportunitites and c) produce a cooperative surplus to 
be shared among the participants in the game.
Minimizing opportunistic behavior and controlling compliance 
to exchange rules is of crucial importance, as the opportunities 
for opportunism are quite unequally distributed within the market 
hierarchy constituting a network. Decision-makers in markets down 
the chain do have to accept interventions in markets up the chain 
as given data; in turn, actors deciding first (and up the chain) 
have to intervene in trust to corresponding behavior of 
collectivities coming later, down the chain. Wagner (1985) 
illustrates the problem with regard to a synchronisation of 
exchange rate and wage policy, giving a double strategic advantage 
to the central bank over collective bargaining parties through 
control of time parameters.
Within the meta-game constituted by a certain market 
hierarchy, the determination of effective exchange rates precedes 
the negotiation of nominal wage levels and collective bargaining 
parties have to flexibly adapt to the space of manoeuvre set by 
currency policy. Moreover, the central bank can continually adjust 
post festum through daily interventions in foreign exchange 
markets, whereas employers, employers associations and trade 
unions are bound in their reactions to the (yearly) rythm of wage 
negotiations. Only a complicated network of mutually stabilizing 
and trust generating expectations that each collective actor acts 




























































































opportunism allows for ongoing, undisruptive transactions. But the 
emergence of trust and effective mutual control is only probable 
if the participating actors are few enough while their exchanges 
are frequent and interdependent enough as to - through the very 
comprehensiveness of the network and the inter-connectedness of 
all exchanges taking place within it - make cheating simply to 
costly.
But inflicting costs upon oneself by inflicting it unto the 
others within the network might, in itself, not be sufficient 
enough a motivation to forego immediate gains through either 
circumventing established rules or little barter deals aside. 
Similarly, the rather vague expectation of overall system payoffs 
due to collective discipline and cooperation in an undetermined 
future might, in itself, be too weak an incenttive to abstain from 
exploiting opportunities for tangential benefits to grab. Instead, 
the promise of a cooperative surplus to be shared later on must be 
made plausible daily, so to speak, in the very process of 
producing these systemic gains by immediate process benefits along 
the way.
Systemic outcomes, in fact, become less precarious an 
achievement to the extent that they can be perceived in terms of 
continual and uncontestable process payoffs and not just as one, 
final rewarding result; to the extent that easing transactions 
becomes in itself a valuable to be exchanged; to the extent that 




























































































means and modes of exchange become part of its ends. With regard 
to political exchange within an extended economic policy 
community, the inducement of "calculated rigidities" by imposing 
certain rules of the game and by controlling the compliance to 
them produces one overall permanent advantage for all 
participants, making up for loosing opportunities of strategic 
interaction - the creation of "concerted", highly predictable 
environments and of stabilized expectations in an otherwise most 
turbulent political and economic world.
As the main and most threatening uncertainties in the 
political-economic arena stem from the complexities of mutually 
contingent, strategic interaction, "concerted" environments for 
any one actor require political exchanges with other organizations 
in the field; but these exchanges must themselves be regulated by 
rules in order to reduce and not to further increase strategic 
interactional complexities. Absorption of uncertainty gives power, 
and to the extent uncertainty can be reduced through coordinated 
and coordinating behavior only, the very process of regulated 
exchange assumes a power-generating capacity. While powers of 
participating actors in the economic policy community vis-à-vis 
each other are constrained by exchange rules, power potentials 
available within the chain through cooperative strategies as well 
as the power of the overall network increase tremendously. 
Generalized political exchange is an inherently power-generating, 




























































































W h a t  f o r  ?
This leads to another, most significant difference between 
elementary, restricted barter and generalized political exchange, 
their enjeux, what is at stakes in the transaction and what it is 
done for. In the 'Italian model', exchange is carried out in order 
to optimize the return in terms of one's own power resources or 
governing capacities. Even if "enlightened" by long-term 
calculation, single organizational self-interest remains the 
exclusive focus at concern. Reference to other collective actors 
in the field or to the exchange partner reduces to increase the 
own strategic rationality. Both sides seek to maximize their total 
payoff, at the other's expense as far as power relations and 
corresponding terms of political trade allow. They will meet for 
exchange where the respective balance of forces - and the 
strategic capacities to skillfully use power resources at disposal 
will lead them to exchange. Consequently, transactions at a 
point which would maximize overall systemic gains, but at the 
expense of the stronger party only, are inconceivable. Political 
barter has the limited purpose of bargaining over the distribution 
and redistribution of public "goodies" (sometimes as with "social 
peace" under control of private organizations); it deals with 
deals of appropriation of categoric goods only.
Generalized exchange, in contrast, does not confine itself to 
the (re)distribution and consumption of public goods by direct 




























































































production of surplus- value through the very regulation of the 
transaction process as well as a provision of mutual insurance 
against the inevitable risks and systemic instabilities of complex 
exchange networks. While organizational self-interest remains the 
driving force and the core focus of consideration, it has always 
to be matched with the systemic imperatives as emboddied in the 
rules of the games and super-games. Thus, optimizing 
organizational returns is mediated by investments into overall 
systems productivity and mutual consideration of elementary, 
"vital" interests of self-reproduction of other, opposing, but 
interdependent actors. All participants seek (or are made to 
effectively take into account) above all overall systemic output, 
as individual organizational payoffs are seen as depending 
primarily on total surplus value to be appropriated in the long 
run, and on the stability of exchange processes in short term. 
Exchange rules codify this primacy of collective systemic over 
particularistic interest pursuit. Actual exchange rates, therefore 
are no simple reflection of existing power dependence-relations, 
or only inasfar as they are compatible with the rules of the game. 
Time and again this implies rebalancing of given power 
differentials, for instance by strengthening the weaker parties 
down the transaction-chain, in order to keep a precarious network 
equilibrium of the extended economic policy community. Generalized 
political exchange is a comprehensive set of games to regulate the
appropriat ion_____ a n d  the production/supply of public goods;
accordingly, it always refers to nothing less but societal 




























































































the collective actors exchanging resources are constituent parts 
of - as well as constituted and functionalized components.
H o w  l o n g  ?
Bilateral political barter of the Italian type, while 
obviously moving exchanges beyond a spot base, remains 
fundamentally restricted not only in scope but also in time. 
Though it stresses linkages between short-term demands and long­
term interests through strategic capacities, these calculations 
themselves remain singular or sporadically recurrent events and no 
stable, long-term, institutionalized orientations. The Italian 
model, quite rightly, conceptualizes political exchanges not as 
contract-like, discrete single transactions but as relations with 
future and in order to control future while at the same time 
reducing the exchange-relation over time to a temporary, 
transitory phenomenon.
The occasional or time-limited character of elementary 
political exchanges is all too understandable, as continuation is 
seen dependent not only on specifically advantageous cost/benefit - 
calculations for any single or series of transactions (Regini 
1983, 362), and that is contingent upon preceding exchanges, but 
also on highly precarious, "permanently temporary" resources such 




























































































the other side. How could political exchange ever go on if unions 
(in recessions) have no market power of organized labor force to 
under-exploit, no rank and file to mobilize in industrial or 
extra-institutional collective action (as people might, 
temporarily, be tired or scared), or another government to 
confront than the one committed to fair returns?
Whereas, at this point, a dyadic, restricted type of 
political barter will actually come to an end, political 
transactions in the overall network of an extended economic policy 
community will, of course, continue - and go on "open-end”. 
Generalized political exchange can be of widely varying degrees of 
network-interconnectedness or interrelational density and also 
allows for dis-connectedness or breakdown of even central linkages 
such as collective bargaining or arbitration. But some overall 
pattern is conceptualized as an enduring, quasi permanent 
structure, of enduring or permanently changing shape. Specific 
structural configurations can change or dissolve, yet some 
exchange-relations and games do always go on. This is a less 
trivial point as it seems to be at first sight, as it shifts time 
horizons and sharpens the criteria for identifying games: It is 
not exchange in general which breaks down from time to time but a 
specific structural constellation, a specific game or meta-game.
Still, the time horizon for any such game or meta-game varies 
itself with the nature of the political exchange. Whereas all 




























































































longitudinal character of the emerging relation, it is 
fundamentally finite in political barter while envisaged in 
principle infinite in extended networks. This open-time has to do 
with the relative social closure of exchange-networks: A small, 
but relatively fixed number of participants, with structural and 
that is "endless" interest interdependence, with multiplex and 
varying, but basically non-interchangeable valuables to offer to 
each other and therefore capable of developing an infinite time 
horizon as the most important of all self-generated sources of 
reproduct ion.
Whether networks of generalized political exchange actually 
persist longer over time than elementary barter relations is a 
matter of empirical investigation only and cannot be decided a 
priori. What counts, however, is the general expectation - of 
constituent collective actors, not of outside scientific observers 
only - that they do; and that if not, a specific game finished 
will be followed by another exchange-relationship of at least some 
continuity with the preceding one terminated. What makes the 
difference, thus, is not so much differential objective duration 
of different forms of political exchange but a generalized, even 
counterfactual expectation of this sort; not real time, but 
collective time horizons and the capacity to extend them in a way 





























































































W h a t  k i n d  w h e n
The two types of political exchange outlined so far do not 
only imply different temporal frames of reference (time horizons, 
operating time structures etc.); they do also need different 
durations to develop, they appear at different points of 
historical time and they display a specific evolutionary time 
order, yet not irreversible. While the time-theoretical aspects 
are more fully elaborated in a related paper (Marin 1985a), I will 
point to just one implication of the time dimension for the 
different scope of the models building on the cases presented.
For in both cases, the conceptual framework derived could be 
argued as being an inductive generalization (and even 
overgeneralization) of quite particualr historical circumstances. 
Pizzorno and his followers in the Italian debate had a specific 
Latin-European problem constellation of industrial labor relations 
in mind - Italy in the period of the latent compromesso storico 
and at the height of union power, in the transitional phase from 
pluralist or pre-corporatist to a neo-corporatist stage, which 
actually never came about. Generalized political exchange, on the 
other hand could be seen as a theoretical generalization of a 
Middle-European-Scandinavian, more corporatist mode of interest 
intermediation. Consequently, both concpetualizations would addrss 




























































































delineate and strictly restricted areas of application - depending 
on the historical place and time of the exchange pattern analysed.
Correspondingly, two distinct forms of political exchange, 
irreducible to each other, would have to be explained within 
different conceptual frameworks. The 'Italian model* would make 
sense of transactions within the more fragmented, "pluralist" 
systems of interest politics (such as in Italy, France, Great 
Britain, United States, Canada, Australia, etc.), whereas more 
"corporatist" arrangements of interest intermediation (such as in 
Norway, Sweden, Finnland, Denmark, Netherlands, Austria, 
Switzerland, evv. West Germany, Israel and Japan) could be 
understood in terms of generalized political exchange. Whenever an 
institutional system changed, another concept of political 
exchange would have to be used. Yet such area- and time-specific 
conceptualizations, I argue, are not only all too modest, but 
actually misleading, as they suppose as mutually exclusive, 
domain-specific generalizations what in fact are concepts of 
different degrees of abstraction, generalization and explanatory 
power.
Elementary, restricted barter and generalized political 
exchange are not so much different real phenomena as they are 
different perspectives to analyse a whole range of political 
transactions. These transactions can be thought of as a continuum 
of political exchanges, ordered by their degree of ordered 




























































































assymetric fit, not interchangeable: Whereas the pole of simple 
political barter can be understood as a limiting case of a 
fragmented network, with disconnected, encapsulated single dyadic 
parts (as rare as it is), an extended exchange-network can never 
be understood as comopsed of such elementary transaction units 
("the whole is more than the sum of its parts"). The simple end of 
the specter is comprehensible from the complex one, but not vice 
versa.
But as the 'Italian model', I hold, has not gone far enough 
in modelling political exchange as to cover more complex (and 
interesting) cases also, it cannot even fully grasp the logic of 
its own, preferred cases in point. For, the actual exchanges in 
the real caso Italiano are extremely more complex than the 
'Italian model' allows us to think. Though there is clearly no 
overarching super-game to which collective actors cling to, their 
exchanges simply cannot be «understood as dyadic transactions, 
calculated independently and ungoverned by respective rules of the 
game - however disconnected or even counteracting the different 
games played are. Political barter is not just barter, but a 
symptom of a failed transaction-chain, a decaying or impossible or 
simply loose network or of something else beyond itself to be 
looked for ("a part is not simply a part, understandable outside 
the whole it is part of").
Generalized political exchange, thus, because of its greater 




























































































certain political transactions, wherever they rank on the scale of 
order and complexity. But in order to order the complexity of this 
analytical tools, a series of rather simple key notions and basic 
assumptions have still to be introduced.
FIRST ELEMENTS OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOME KEY NOTIONS AND 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Ordering Complexity and All-Out Interdependence
The overwhelming "complexity of the world" - starting point 
of some theories - might in fact be too simple a formula to 
actually come to terms with it. This complexity is often 
interpreted as all-out interdependence: "Everything has to do *-:ith 
everything else". This, of course, is beyond the possibility of 
adequate comprehension, and understanding seems possible only at 
the price of heroic simplifications - the economic model of 
perfect market competition being the most prominent case in point 
of such modelling of all-out interdependence.
Yet, structures reducing mind-blowing complexities are often 
not just nothing but insufficient mental constructs, but (more or 
less ingenious) inventions materialized in (interorganizational) 
interactions - to be reconstructed by theory. Following Simon
(1962) and von Hayek (1972), I assume that complexity is always 




























































































architecture is not a simple, but a complex theoretical task. The 
concept of hierarchy is a key notion in ordering this complexity.
Hierarchies
Hierarchy, as used in this paper, is not a structure of 
bureaucratic command and subordination, "the visible hand" of 
state administration or of managerial control over the modern 
capitalist, industrial corporation. As such, it would be there or 
not; and wherever it existed, it were a clear-cut alternative to 
decentralized markets. Hierarchy in the sense of Simon, in 
contrast, is an asymmetric interdependence or power-relationship 
between system elements and, consequently, a matter of degree: 
Systemic relations are more or less hierarchically organized, and 
so are markets.
Perfectly competitive markets would be the limiting case of 
minimal hierarchy: No collective actor had the power to affect the 
overall market system and none had any authoritative control over 
other, competing organizations - participants had "no weight". In 
the world of really existing capitalism, however, oligopolistic 
coalitions, cartels, trusts, mergers, interlocking directorates 
etc., that is horizontally or vertically integrated power clusters 
make for powerful hierarchies within "imperfect markets"; and for 
a large repertoire of practices from discriminatory pricing to 





























































































Hierarchies (in markets or other exchange systems) form 
constraining structures or strategic rigidities, to which other 
system elements have to adjust flexibly. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, these strategic rigidities can increase the overall 
systems capacity of flexible adaption to turbulent environments: 
It all depends on the specific mix of structural rigidities and 
complementary looseness.
All-out interdependent (Simon's "richly joined") systems, on 
the contrary, might paralyse their overall adaptive capacities for 
indiscriminate adjustments: Due to an effective, rapid, and 
multiplying information-flow through many channels, disruptive 
environmental influences can produce potential chocks for the 
entire system instead for the single element directly affected 
only. All-out interdependent systems, therefore are prone to 
strong fluctuations and instabilities, with highly precarious 
states of temporary equilibria at any given point in time.
What Simon calls "hierarchical, loosely joined systems" are 
more stable and adaptive at the level of the overall 
configuration. Adaptation is thought as taking place at the lowest 
level required for effective operation, through specialized 
subsystems into which the complex whole is functionally 
differentiated. Density or looseness of connections between 
sysbsystems is seen as a function of systems reproduction, and 
direct linkages as correspondingly selective and restricted. The 




























































































level. Highly structured interchanges between subsystems make each 
of them "relatively autonomous" and not easily to be penetrated by 
other specialized parts. The overall structure moves less rapidly 
and sensitively than all-out interdependent systems, but it is 
also less probable to collapse out of misadaptation.
Market Hierarchies
The concept of market hierarchies derives from transfering 
the idea of hierarchical structure within single markets to the 
relationship between markets. Little is to be said about it here, 
as it is elaborated in a related paper (Marin/Wagner 1985). There, 
it is defined as a politically induced ordering of interdependent 
markets, which simultaneously structures the sequences of 
decision-making in macroeconomic policies and attributes
differential power to the collective actors joining the
meta(super)game or political-economic order/regime. While meta- 
games are themselves constituted by political exchange, they do 
also determine the rules for possible exchanges, moves, political 
strategies and interactions of organized interests participating 
in a series of political games possible within the regime. 
Generalized political exchange allows to analyse this 
paradoxically ordered complexity, if related to two other 
conceptualizations of hierarchy: The notion of cybernetic control 





























































































Generalized political exchange, I claim, enables us to link 
otherwise unrelated analytical levels of abstraction. It makes the 
very linkage between socio-economic structures, polit ical 
institutions and economic programs (public policies or games 
within regimes) and their dynamic interplay the focus of 
attention.
Their interrelationship is thought of a kind of Cybernetic 
control hierarchy. Industrial, class and power structures as 
energizing and conditioning, but politically underdetermined 
factors; political games or economic policies within regimes as 
information steering/programing/controlling elements, but programs 
constrained by socio-economic structures and institutions; and 
political institutions intermediating the determining forces from 
"above" and "below" through selection and transformation, as 
closest interpénétrations are found between adjacent system 
levels.
This simple cybernetic or hierarchy model of intersystem 
linkages, though its logic is borrowed from Parsons (1961, 37 -44, 
1968, 136-152), does neither accept assumptions about a two-way 
causality, nor general assertions about control priorities from 




























































































bottom up (ecological schemes, Marxism) - their relative 
determining power being a matter of empirical investigation only.
Furthermore, the simple cybernetic control model might well 
reduce, but does not fully grasp the complexity of any specific 
process of interchange between interpenetrated system levels. Take 
managing an economy as a crucial case in point. Here, governance 
is aimed at by a specific mix of public policies, to induce 
prefered behavior. Any single of these macroeconmic policies (as 
an exchange rate policy) can be seen as a political game. These 
games take place within a given set of institutional arrangements 
and socio-economic structures, constraining the space of possible 
action, manoeuvre, strategy and political exchange between 
participants. But the games take also place within the constraints 
of a market hierarchy seen as a meta(super)game, whereby this 
order/regime itself is induced or constituted by the very same 





























































































FIG. 1: A TANGLED, CYBERNETIC CONTROL HIERARCHY (DETERMINING


































































































Tangled Hierarchies of Games
The transaction-chain implied by a certain market hierarchy 
must at the same time be seen as a structure/system of rules 
determining possible actions/strategies as well as an outcome of 
strategic choices of interacting organized interests imposing 
certain rules of a super-game in order to regulate their own 
interactions/exchanges. It is difficult to see how the dialectics 
between action and systems aspects of ongoing interactions between 
collective (political) actors could be analysed without a notion 
such as generalized political exchange - avoiding structural 
(ecological, Marxist) or institutionalist (neo-corporatist) 
determinism as much as a more voluntaristic action-perspective 
often going with notions of simple, barter type political 
exchange .
Conceiving generalized political exchange as a structured 
circular flow of determining influences between mutually 
interpenetrated, but relatively autonomous systems levels, can be 
done by using the notion of strange loops or tangled hierarchies 
(Hofstadter 1979). Collective actors are creators as well as 
creatures of market hierarchies of meta-games; political exchanges 
are constituted by certain games while constituting other games 
called meta-games, in order to disentangle the seeming paradox of 
a strange loop. Meta-games comprise rules determining what games 
can be played at all and how the rules of these games can be 




























































































collective actors play several games, meta-games etc. at the same 
time, modifying the rules while playing the games. But even this 
power struggle over the rules of the games, meta-games etc. 
follows, at any given point in time, a set of at least implicit 
conventions of how to go about the struggle - that is the self­
modification of rules through self-modifying rules etc.
What research on self-modifying games of generalized 
political exchange can do in order to disentangle these tangled 
hierarchies is to reconstruct what the participants themselves do 
in order to come to terms with it: To sort out rigidities and 
flexibilities, hardware and software rules, givens and 
disposables, and that is the implicit hierarchy of rules and games 
at a given time. We might expect that the length of the time 
period holding constant a certain hierarchy varies itself 
systematically, and more complex forms of generalized political 
exchange require and enable more extended time horizons and 
stability of complex rule systems than the rules governing a 
singular barter deal or recurrent political transactions between 
two actors only.
The tangled hierarchies of generalized political exchange are 
not only more complex, productive and stable, wherever maintained; 
their maintenance, on the other hand, is highly unprobable, more 
risky and precarious and more costly in terms of transaction- 
specific investments - to keep an extended exchange-network in 




























































































reason for entropie tendencies in generalized exchange systems is 
the underlying structural divergence/ antagonism of high-powered 
interests participating in the political transactions and their 
ongoing power struggle within and through the network. But why, 
then, interpret transactions as exchange and not just in terms of 
struggle, domination, subordination etc.?
Antagonistic Cooperation as Political Exchange
Governance of market hierarchies requires interaction of 
functionally interdependent, often mutually contingent, but 
competing or even antagonistic interests; it implies conflict and 
cooperation. Without interest opposition, cooperation would not be 
necessary and without interest interdependence, it would not be 
possible. These mixed games will be called antagonistic 
cooperation, and their very basic structure makes for exchange 
between opponents, however unequal or unbalanced.
Exchange through antagonistic cooperation cannot be explained 
by institutional factors alone, as traditional (liberal pluralist 
as well as neo-corporatist) theories do. They locate antagonisms 
and clevages within structures and policies, while attributing the 
regulation of conflicts to institutions. Certain (collective 
bargaining, corporatist etc.) arrangements are expected to lead, 




























































































and interest intermediation - whilst they actually very often do 
not.
Instead, I hold, ongoing exchange and that is cooperation 
between competitors and antagonists has to be accounted for by 
economic policies and regimes as well, and their interdependence 
with institutions. Games make for a specific "concertation" of 
adversarial interests, and the very constitution of super-games 
will be brought about by dominant social coalitions of rival 
interests only. Thus, both pre- and extra-institutional forces 
come into play when transforming all-out struggle into 
opportunity-structures for political exchange.
Even institutionalized antagonistic cooperation, to be sure, 
does never end the continual struggle over the terms of exchange, 
the rules of the games and meta-games. Cooperation and exchange is 
structurally limited in capitalist societies: Although the rules 
of the games and meta-games of antagonistic cooperation have to be 
agreed upon, they cannot be established and developed by 
cooperation alone. Exchange-regulating devices can channel and 
transform, but never remove or permanently freeze the class 
conflicts and other antagonisms underlying institutions and games.
Political exchange, therefore, is no counter-concept to 
exploitation or domination, but it indicates the transformation of 
class struggle into a permanent war of position between collective 




























































































associations seeking to gain organizational advantages over 
adversaries within the institutional system in highly "organized" 
societies. All rules of games and super-games and their very scope 
of application are subject to persistent conflict - and 
compromise.
Political exchange, thus, does not imply that class struggle 
is simply "institutionalized", but that class conflicts and other 
modes of power struggle are always also conflicts over the rules 
of a multiplicity of simultaneous political games, meta-games and 
intitutional practices, requiring antagonistic cooperation.
At this point, I will shortly summarize what is specific 
about political exchange and generalized political exchange.
What Makes Political Exchange Political?
In political exchange, it is the rules of the game which 
determine possible strategies, and not the strategies which 
determine the game. Political games, unlike market exchange, 
cannot be conceived as emergent regularities only: They are not 
just an unintended outcome of purposeful action (Crozier/Friedberg 
1977), but meaningful, collectively wanted regulating structures 





























































































Thus, exchange rules define the opportunity structures for 
political transactions and constraints for possible strategies. 
Political exchange takes place within these constraints imposed by 
the rules of the game, but it is also the power struggle over the 
rules themselves, their scope of validity as well as over what 
game to play at all - with power differentials between actors 
differing with the level of power struggle.
Exchanges are political not only if they involve trading the 
power resources held by the state in exchange for consensus or 
support of public policies by privte interest organizations, in 
order not to endanger or damage the socio-political order. 
Moreover, I consider exchanges political whenever they either 
require or cause collective action (instead of single 
organizational or market strategies) of collective actors; or if, 
through their being part of larger, more comprehensive networks of 
generalized exchange, obstructive consequences for ongoing 
political games (economic policies) or even an established meta­
game (political-economic regime) might occur.
Consequently, purely private actors, such as large companies, 
might engage in political exchanges (e.g. through strategic 
planning decisions) without state involvement, as long as their 
actions are themselves politically coordinated; or aimed at 
political response; or, having unintentionally affected ongoing 
games, could convert their disruptive potential for political 




























































































Exchanges are political not because the participants involved 
are political actors such as political parties or state agencies, 
nor because the resources exchanged are non-economic or non­
monetary: State procurement or (sub)contracting, parties buying 
newspapers or TV-channels or the use of money as a power resource 
might provide sufficient examples to dismiss this idea. On the 
other hand, state procurement or contracting policies to maintain 
domestic industries, can, of course, be part of political
exchanges, as can be the acquisition policy of a party; whether
they actually are or not depends on their main contextual
reference. It is this (political, power) reference frame of
transactions, not the immanent nature of the trading parties or 
the valuables traded, which makes political exchanges political.
Still, trading parties and exchange processes in political 
transactions differ systematically from economic market exchanges. 
In numbers, they are restricted: Few actors instead of many. With 
regard to context, structures extend into the transaction: Actors 
are ordered, not "unweighted" and equal. With regard to underlying 
interests, they are neither sufficiently congruent (as in 
organizations) nor independent (as in competitive markets): 
Rather, they are fundamentally divergent or even 
opposed/antagonistic, but also interdependent, to the point of 
mutual contingency; and it is the very process of political 





























































































As this transformation process takes time and develops 
further over time, political in contrast to market exchange cannot 
be a singular act of contractual agreement, but is an evolving, 
enduring, longitudinal relationship. Social "pacts" - such as the 
famous Swedish peace treaty or the Swiss "Arbeitsfrieden" of the 
prewar period or the Moncloa pact in the recent Spanish transition 
period form authoritarianism to democracy - however historically 
decisive they might have become later, in themselves are not yet 
political exchanges, but (at best) first, initiating steps towards 
future exchange. British "social contracts" in the seventies 
demonstrate that pacts, while expressing a preceding compromise 
and hopes for continuing cooperation, often (and may be more often 
than not) do not constitute the start of ongoing political 
exchanges.
This leads to a final distinction of political in contrast to 
economic market exchanges: Transactions do not only need time to 
develop at all and develop further over time and create their own, 
transaction-specific time horizons and patterns, they do always 
also develop within a specific historical time. Historical time 
impregnates political exchanges profoundly and decides about what 
possible developmental path they actually take. Other than 
economic market transactions, political exchanges simply cannot be 
understood without their historical origins and genetic evolution, 





























































































But what, then, makes generalized political exchange a 
distinct and most precarious type of political exchange - and its 
prototype also? The following paragraph summarizes some of the 
preceding discussions.
Approximating Generalized Political Exchange
- Generalized political exchange (GPE) is an analytical tool of
encompassing scope: It deals with a specific class of
transactions concerning the overall political economy/ecology, 
that is comprehensive macroeconomic/-political management. 
Consequently, the terrain it focuses on as an exchange field is 
a politically induced and ordered interdependence of a 
multiplicity of markets (or other constraining factors such as 
technological, ecological, spatial etc. conditions) and their 
interpenetration with political arenas - and not just "the 
political aspects of the labour market", defined as "political 
m a r k e t " , as in Scambio p o litico. This domain or space which in 
the 'Italian model' is called the "political market" comprises 
exchanges necessary to establish market hierarchies as well as 
all transactions possible within a network of political games. 
But neither can this network of generalized political exchange 
be reduced to a market model, nor can politics in general.
- GPE deals not only with the (r e )distribution/appropriation of 
public goods or with regulatory policies, but also with the 




























































































of participating actors against inevitable transactional risks. 
This value-adding production of public goods through GPE 
requires a division of political labor between collective 
actors. The corresponding role-set for inter-organizational 
concertation makes that the "political market" is no market, but 
better understood by a combination of supply-side and mutual 
insurance models of politics .
- The principle enjeu of GPE is societal governance that is socio­
economic reproduction and directing development, and not just 
any political game, as salient as it might be (abortion, soft 
drugs or riots in soccer might constitute "hot" policy issues 
typically below this threshold, whereas an undisputed removal of 
technical barriers in foreign trade would be important enough, 
even if "invisible" in public).
- The specific roles of collective actors are defined by their
position within the exchange-network, and so are the resources 
at their disposal. Thus, participants are constituted by the 
very exchange system, and networks can even be distinguished by 
the degree they socialize their member behavior - how
"totalizing" they are within their partial, but crucial domain. 
But even well integrated and most extensive exchange structures 
do not fully control their constituent actors, as almost the 
very same organized collectivities did constitute the network 




























































































emergence/creation or remaining outside the regime - the non­
exchange elements of exchange-systems - are persistent sources 
of structural change or game-disintegration; as are actor 
excluded from games they originally helped to bring about or 
late (new)comers to the transaction-cycle. No collective actors, 
by its very nature, takes part in all games of generalized 
political exchange, including the state and labor organizations.
GPE takes place within long chains (cycles, rings etc.) of 
political exchange or exchange networks, not within a situation 
of more or less isolated, pure and simple barter. Even if 
recurrent or even prevalent in certain polities, barter -simple 
or sophisticated - is nothing but a borderline case of political 
concertation; and more often its disruption.
Consequently, GPE is multi-lateral, not bi-partite or tri­
partite. This does not preclude, of course, that all kinds of 
particular deals from simple, dyadic barter to most 
sophisticated triangular or more extended logrollings might be 
possible within the overall, multi-lateral structure of the 
exchange network. GPE differs from political barter not so much 
that the latter is typically bi-partite while the former is 
multi-lateral, but that within the comprehensive cycles of GPE 
all barter of lower order is regulated and controlled by 
systemic rules, preventing that tangential or side payments or 




























































































go on, but it becomes a function of generalized exchange 
patterns .
With regard to resources exchanged, GPE is multi-dimensional, 
and no one-dimensional transaction of social power resources of 
private interest organizations for political power resoruces of 
the state. In GPE, the spectrum of valuables traded ranges from 
cooperative, non-strategic information-transfer over mutual 
recognition of political status rights to outright blackmail 
over rule compromise; with generalized compliance to specific 
and highly differential rules as the common minimal denominator.
The generalized rule compliance of each participant constitutes 
the valued return which the compliance of other actors in the 
network is contingent upon. GPE does not link mutually rewarding 
two party/two way transactions, but constitutes a reciprocally 
contingent, directed flow of compliance with a system of rules 
imposing different and non-interchangeable obligations on 
different collective actors - a hierarchically ordered division 
of political labor.
Political barter requires resources as well as strategic 
capacities to use them. GPE, in contrast, more often than not 
requires the capacity of one or some collective actors to induce 
other players to systematically forego opportunities for 
exchanges or strategic capacities alltogether, in exchange for 
either process benefits or hardly calcualble system payoffs. 




























































































super-games should be distinguished from Pizzorno's 
conceptualization, where strategic capacities can consist in a 
well calculated under-exploitation of opportunities for 
immediate gains in expectation of future benefits. Renouncing 
strategy as a kind of meta-strategy is the limiting case of this 
development away from interactive and towards more roundabout 
forms of rationality.
This systems rationality could not emerge within (even perfectly 
competitive) political markets, whereas it comes about within a 
well accepted regime of well-organized networks of political 
exchange. Opportunistic behavior of collective actors is 
minimized by the very comprehensiveness of the netwrors, the 
density and frequency of transactions between few participants, 
the systemic interdependence of their effects, the restricted, 
time-limited, short-term character of any concession compared 
with the encompassing, enduring, long-term character of the 
cooperative regime they are part of.
GPE does neither need the state nor other centers creating the 
'political market', as do public interventions or policies in 
Pizzorno's model. Instead, we have to acknowledge a multiplicity 
of functional equivalent nuclei or (more or less interlocking) 
nodes , often dominant coalitions of participant actors. By 
establishing certain market hierarchies (meta-games) or imposing 
policies (games) pursued within them, these nuclei structure the 
exchange networks and the power differentials between players 
according to their position within the transaction-chain. 




























































































with those "third parties" or "power banks" guaranteeing that 
political obligations within the transaction-set will be kept. 
All those roles are neither fixed once for ever, but change with 
the games played/meta-games imposed; nor is "the state" a 
structurally privileged or even determining actor, but one 
collective party among others - often not an hegemonic or only 
important one indeed.
- GPE is a generalized transaction-pattern, mediating interchanges 
across subsystem boundaries. While it is no symbolic medium 
itself, it builds on generalized media of exchange and 
subsystem-specific resources such as money, power, influence, 
value-commitments, trust, political credits, 'half-knowledge' 
etc., which are partly self-generated and autonomously
reproduced components of politically coded intersystem-
exchanges. Its logic requires a theoretical exploration of its 
own.
This paper was presented at the Xlllth World Congress of the 
International Political Science Association (IPSA), Paris, July 
15-20, 1985, in the special meeting on "Social and Political 
Exchange: A Critical Overview"; and partly first in my seminar on 
"Theories of Political Exchange" at the European University 
Institute. I would like to thank the participants of both groups 
for a productive exchange of ideas. In the course of preparing and 
discussing this paper, I have learned in particular from critical 
questions and comments by Ian Budge, Paolo Ceri, Michel Crozier, 
Luigi Graziano, Patrick Kenis, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Dalia Marin, 
Antonio Mutti, Adriano Pappalardo, Franz Urban Pappi, Leonardo 
Parri, Claus Offe, Sandro Pizzorno, Fritz Scharpf, Philipp 
Schmitter, Gunther Teubner and Michael Wagner; without adequately 
reciprocating my intellectual debts to any of them. Instead, I 
trust the emergence of a more general social science discourse on 
generalized political transactions and precarious inter- 
organizational concertation, which would be interesting to wider 
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